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Aping the Ape: Kafka's "Report to an Academy"
Abstract
The "Report to an Academy" narrates a curious situation: an ape presents (or rather, performs) a report to an
academy. What he presents is an autobiography. Like so much in Kafka, the "Report" is a parable about writing
in general and about the writer's identity in particular. This essay attempts to address these issues through a
close reading of Kafka's text against Blanchot's L'espace littéraire. Central to this endeavour is an analysis of the
ape's use of the first-person pronoun as someone who fashions himself while, at the same time, presenting a
theatrical autobiography featuring the self in question. My reading then moves on to analyze the act of writing
as a negotiation of the passage between self and other, framed as it is by the theatrical context of Kafka's
parable.
This article is available in Studies in 20th Century Literature: http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol19/iss2/2
Aping the Ape: Kafka's "Report to an Academy" 
Ziad Elmarsafy 
Wellesley College 
This essay is an attempt at reading Kafka's "Report to an Acad- 
emy" in light of the following quote from Blanchot's The Space of 
Literature: 
Writing is the interminable, the incessant. The writer, it is said, 
gives up saying "I." Kafka remarks, with suprise, with enchant- 
ment, that he has entered into literature as soon as he can substitute 
"He" for "I." . If to write is to surrender to the interminable, the 
writer who consents to sustain writing's essence loses the power to 
say "I." And so he loses the power to make others say "I." Thus he 
can by no means give life to characters whose liberty would be 
guaranteed by his creative power. The notion of characters, as the 
traditional form of the novel, is only one of the compromises by 
which the writer, drawn out of himself by literature in search of its 
essence, tries to salvage his relations with the world and himself. 
(26-27) 
There are, to this end, three initial assumptions on which this 
reading is based. First, it is assumed that the "Report" is a parabolic 
investigation of the situation of the writer in general and of the writer 
in the first person in particular. Second, that this writer is Kafka himself, 
although the name ought, perhaps, to be placed in quotes. Third, that the 
space of this parable is the locus of a certain de-metaphorisation 
whereby the figurative is made literal. In parable, therefore, an ape 
speaks. The "Report" traces the development and subsequent (but 
necessary) failure of an identity. Blanchot's starting-point is with the 
move from first to third person as sine qua non for the production of 
writing. The concern of the "Report," on the other hand, is with the 
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converse procedure, with writing in the first person after having started 
in the third.' The ape's situation as a performer is the parabolic 
equivalent of the situation of the writer. The ape epitomizes, in his act, 
the impossibility of saying "I" without qualification, and consequently 
the utter impossibility of writing an autobiography. Caught in such a 
situation, the only possible relation to the self is performative: one 
cannot say "I" or locate "I" with any certainty; one can only enact "I," 
quote "I," recite "I." In so doing, one runs into and is trapped in the clash 
between two opposing visions of the self, of which some paired variants 
can be described as the continuous and discrete self, past and present 
self, empirical and transcendent self, narrated and narrating self, Ithen 
and I 
now 
.2 The ape's identity is caught in the gap that separates each of 
these like a reflection trapped in two opposing mirrors. The self thus 
forged is permanently doomed to this oscillation. 
There are, in this context, two components to the vector of the ape's 
self, the formative and the performative. They are mutually dependent; 
neither without either could or would obtain. The first is located in the 
ape's observation of the sailors through the bars of his cage and his 
taking them for his specular doubles. This tendency towards mistaking 
humans for himself is continued in the parallels he draws between 
himself and his audience during his performance. The second is played 
out in the performance itself and in the necessary repetition of this 
performance on future occasions. As we watch, or read, Kafka' s ape, we 
bear witness to the presentation of the self in a timeless universe, a self 
that only exists at the moment of its presentation before an audience.' 
The ape's relationship to himself is theatrical: he cannot say "I," he can 
only play it. In tracing the development of this performed identity, I 
would like to proceed in stages, first establishing the parallels between 
the ape and the writer, second, turning to the "mirror stage" that enables 
and forms the crux of the ape's self-presentation, and finally examining 
in detail the dynamics of the performance and its consequences.' 
A Portrait of the Artist as an Ape: 
In principle, the final consequence of the metamorphosis of"I" into 
"he" is the formation of an (auctorial, written) identity. The act of 
writing, the extended trope by which first person becomes third, is to a 
certain extent an obsessive return to the mirror stage wherein the self is 
made, constructed both as self and other simultaneously, and where the 
necessity ofthe lacking self as requisite condition for self-(re)production 
is discovered. 
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The question of first-person narration is thus complicated by the 
path traced by this grammatical transformation leading to the self 
through the other. To say "I" is, as we have seen, to create an illusion, 
to pretend that there is a stable entity that can be localized in the constant 
oscillation between narrator and narrated entity. Kafka's "Report" 
would have us believe that such an entity has been created, that the ape 
has succeeded in producing a (temporally, grammatically) stable "I." 
Ostensibly he has re-traced the steps that once led to the formation of 
his mirror image by narrating his autobiography, ostensibly he returns 
to the framework of a subject whose self-designation follows the arrow 
oftime forward, from past to present, an entity driven by an overcoming 
of its past. The past has not been overcome, however, and this is where 
the comic element enters: what the ape represents is a grammatical 
rather than a physical mirror stage. He does not see his real specular 
double/himself. He incessantly disavows his corporeal reality. The 
ape's mauvaisefoi functions as a motor that drives his entire project and 
serves as a basis for his claims as a subject, which could be listed as 
follows: I am I; I am not I, I am he; I have an ape's body but am not an 
ape since I have a human mind (cogito ergo sum), I am now essentially 
but not apparently human, a Middle European cast in an early twentieth 
century mould.' Or, in shorter form: I was what I was; I am what I am 
(and will continue to be so) and hereby declare (proclaim, narrate) that 
to be the case. 
Thus we see the ape's situation closely parallel that of the writer as 
described by Blanchot: ostensibly, he transcends his own individuality 
in order to lose himself in universals, adopting the style of an "average" 
Middle European in the process. Ostensibly, too, he speaks in the style 
of the academy; ostensibly he says "I." There is, however, a certain 
inescapable falsity about it all, a falsity of which the ape is himself only 
too well aware. This falsity also proves necessary if he is to succeed in 
being himself before his learned spectators. He is not, after all, one of 
Hagenbeck's typical drinking partners, as he implies. The ape is 
doomed to the failure occasioned by the disjunction between his 
essence and his appearance. This failure is, however, central to the 
production of authority, both of the speaker and of the writer. The 
process of moving from third to first person and the separation from 
oneself (whereby other becomes Other and I becomes nobody) is 
catalyzed to initiate a process of re-connection so that "I" becomes, in 
a literal sense, the other. 
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His Body, His Other, His Self 
The ape's mirror stage can be broken down into three important 
phases, as it were: the negation of his body, the discovery of the human 
specular double and, finally, the formation of his "self." 
The ape invokes the "Red Peter" incident within the first two 
paragraphs of the account of his capture. He resents the name because 
it is strictly corporeal. It does not take into account the internal change 
that puts him miles ahead of the "performing ape Peter, who died not 
long ago and had some small local reputation" (248).6 The ape also 
undertakes a special effort to display and disavow his body simulta- 
neously, as though the display of his bullet wounds (and the concomi- 
tant display of his body) were standard operating procedure in the 
service of the truth. The ape makes a case for himself by displaying the 
evidence as represented by the so-called wanton shotthat made its mark 
on his well-groomed fur. Despite his polite protestations to the con- 
trary, our hero is quite sensitive to human efforts at inscribing the signs 
of domination on his body, and insists on making frequent mention 
thereof: the bars of the cage cut into his flesh, when he thinks he thinks 
with his belly, and when he urges his listeners to understand his situation 
he admonishes them to scratch themselves raw between the toes. It is 
remarkable that all these instances involve the removal of his "well- 
groomed fur," the one sign of corporeality that stands between him and 
the world of men. When his first mentor tried to vent his rage at the ape's 
Affennatur he tried to burn his fur off. His formation as a thinking entity 
starts with that inscription; his cogito depends as much on an awareness 
of his body, albeit tinted with the stain of disavowal, as it does on a 
perception of his mind. 
The ape's transformation from an animal into something more 
developed depends on his body, or rather on a body. Our hero 
undergoes his formative experience with the image of a human body 
rather than the body of an ape before him, gazing at the sailors through 
the mirror that was the bars of his cage. The first trick that he learns, the 
human handshake, marks the culmination of something that has been in 
the making ever since his days on the Hagenbeck steamer. His under- 
standing of freedom further confirms his corporeal obsession as well as 
his choice of a specular double. To him the epitome of human freedom 
is represented by the flying trapeze, "movement that masters itself 
(250)" ' selbstherrliche Bewegung,' (175) precisely because, like him, 
it is conceptually trapped in the space of the body. The paragraph's 
closing sentence seals the coupling between ape and man, between the 
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performer and his audience: "Were the apes to see such a spectacle, no 
theatre walls could stand the shock of their laughter" (250) `Kein Bau 
wiirde standhalten vor dem Gelachter des A ffentums bei diesem Anblick' 
(171). Indeed the laughter of the apes echoes the laughter of his own 
audience, a laughter provoked by the sight of one species aping the 
other, with the difference that what humans perform on the level of the 
body, the ape performs on the level of the mind. Being blind to one's 
own limitations as well as to that which delimits and defines the self 
is for him part and parcel of being human. This helps explain his 
valorization of the term Ausweg as against freedom; the former stands 
for the passage from one such aporetic identity to another.' Further- 
more, the ape's linguistic perception of his human would-be doubles is 
quite telling. The sailors on board the steamer are seen on a strictly 
corporeal level, their gestures approximate the behaviour of animals 
rather than men: they do everything slowly, they spit when and 
wherever possible,their laughter is canine. Eventually the ape sees them 
through the same filter of anonymity through which most humans view 
apes: in much the same way that every performing ape is called "Red 
Peter," the ape points out that in his eyes, "it seemed that there was only 
one man" (250). Seeing the sailors move further emphasises the 
example set by the trapeze artist; both are examples of humans moving 
unimpeded. Once the mirror image has been established in this way, it 
is recognized as such, whence the conception of his project: "A lofty 
goal faintly dawned before me" (251). 
And so he imitates, but what is truly striking is his lucidity 
regarding the very object of his imitation. The ape apes not just men as 
a species but rather men and their aporia, the things that make them so 
typically menschlich and more than a little grotesque. One ofthe biggest 
problems, he tells us, was the one posed by the schnapps bottle. In what 
is otherwise a relatively disinterested narrative tone there is a change of 
scale once the ape addresses his drinking problem. In relating his 
rehearsals he never fails to mention his disgust at the bottle; it is the only 
part of the performance that he could not master (he even remembered 
to rub his belly and grin, like his model). Qua ape, he is disgusted by 
the taste of the schnapps. His disgust betrays his Affennatur, intruding 
as it does onto his facade of recognizably human antics. This is what 
separates the final performance from its precedents: by hiding his 
disgust, the ape manages to make it all look natural and feign that most 
human of attributes, the lack of self-perception. 
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To a certain extent, his mastery of the bottle underlines a further 
transformation even more important for his purposes. Before he ad- 
dresses the issue of the bottle he describes his early attempts at yet 
another addiction, the pipe. It took him a long time, he tells us, to learn 
the difference between an empty bottle and a full one. Later, as he 
describes the revulsion that the schnapps causes him, he remarks that 
the feeling persisted despite the bottle's emptiness. As well it should 
have. Part of what the ape masters is the idea of consumption and 
assimilation, and during his groundbreaking performance on board he 
acts as though his digestive system appreciated receiving the contents 
of a bottle of schnapps. Part of what he learns on the day of his first 
"Hallo!" is the difference between an empty bottle of schnapps and a 
full one. He learns, moreover, that a full bottle of schnapps can leave 
one intoxicated: it is hard to tell whether he speaks out of drunkenness 
or out of delight, but the prefatory gesture (tossing the bottle away like 
an artist) leads us to believe that he has been separated from himself 
slightly, that the human equivalent of his first "Hallo!" would have been 
an intoxicated dance on the table. Kafka's parable of evolution could 
be summed up as the formation of a human subjectivity as a direct result 
of an ape's intoxication. 
Performance 
Thus the first step leading out of the cage involves the ape's staging 
himselfbefore the sailors, as he will continue to do before his audiences 
later on. They see an ape speaking, ostensibly in his own name, an ape 
who says "I" and who in so doing declares himself to be a former ape. 
He never declares himself to be human; his evolution is not a metamor- 
phosis in the strict sense.' As a former ape in the world of men, his 
condition is predicated on and regulated by the aforementioned solitude 
so crucial to the execution of his endeavour. His project, existentially 
speaking, can be summed up as the will to present himself before an 
audience and thus be validated. His status as a performer is bound 
inextricably with his situation as an erstwhile ape. His task would 
otherwise prove senseless: "I could not risk putting into words even 
such insignificant information as I am going to give you if I were not 
quite sure of myself and if my position on all the great variety stages 
of the world had not become quite unassailable" (246). 
This raises the question of how his reputation at the variety was 
formed. One would assume that he acquired this position through the 
imitation of men, by engaging in what would, after all, be sophisticated 
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circus tricks: it is no accident that the two earlier versions of the 
"Report" took the form of an interview with the trainer. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the "Report" itself falls into the category of 
variety showpieces; something standard, recited, learned by heart and 
delivered.9 This in no way detracts from its remarkable character: most 
circus tricks are nowhere near as intricate, as meticulously worded or 
executed. Spectacle or not, the ape does speak, and in his own name at 
that. And yet his self-proclamation depends in no small part on his 
disavowal of the better part of his Affentum.1° The trick he turns is to 
map the opposition between animal and human onto one between past 
and present and then to disclaim the past by claiming an alibi (the 
present "I" was not there, I was an ape). His disavowal, as we have seen, 
founders on the wandering rocks of corporeality: if the ape's discourse 
provokes a few bemused smiles it is because there is a sense that he tries 
to take the same quantum leap with his body as he did with his mind. 
There is method, if not necessity, in his failure, however: how else is he 
to enact the incessant comings and goings between the boundaries ofthe 
oscillating wave function of the self, between animal and human, past 
and present, 'then and Inow? 
Conclusions and Consequences 
We are now ready to re-evaluate the situation of the ape as an entity 
whose subjectivity is invented through its performance. It is clear that, 
in addition to making the claim of no longer being an ape, the speaker 
adds an extra set of quotation marks to his speech. On a first reading, 
if one were to judge by the content of the story, the ape narrates himself 
and distances himself from other apes (Peter and his wife) as well as 
from his own past in the animal kingdom. At the same time he distances 
himself from the human community: he never, it merits repeating, says 
that he has become human, but merely that he has established a 
reputation as a performer, as a player of parts, or rather of one part, 
namely himself, the ape caught between Affentum and humanity. As 
part of this narrative he narrates the founding moment, the one where 
his identification with the (human) other came to a head and where, in 
a fit of self-overcoming, he left himself to become the other. There is 
no more convincing way to present this crossing-over to the audience 
and to render realistically the extent of the distance crossed except by 
being a speaking ape, thus presenting both past and present selves 
simultaneously. His presentation of the two sides of himself, his lucid 
disavowal of one and valorization of the other has its uses, too. In 
7
Elmarsafy: Aping the Ape: Kafka's "Report to an Academy"
Published by New Prairie Press
166 STCL, Volume 19, No. 2 (Summer, 1995) 
issuing such (presumably legitimizing) statements as, "your life as 
apes [ihr Affentum], gentlemen, insofar as something of that kind lies 
behind you, cannot be farther removed from you than mine is from 
me," (245) he mirrors back to his audience a very real image of 
themselves. He shows them the ethos of disavowal that makes them 
what they are (in his eyes at least): a species of actors." As the ape 
narrates himself, he transposes the human/animal opposition onto one 
between present self and past self, but proceeds to undermine the very 
existence of this past through his claims regarding the unspeakability 
of his Affentum, due, allegedly, to a faulty memory. Everything attains 
a performative textual status with the ape: since his days of Affentum 
do not agree with that sort of approach, their very facticity will be called 
into question. If there is anything about him that does lend itself to 
narration, it is only because it has been dragged into the compass of the 
present. The animal side is now re-inscribed as a subset of the human. 
He does not do much more than delimit himself, than say, "I am here 
and now, casting myself in the form of a fiction." And yet, it is the 
inscription of one phase within the boundaries of the other that sets his 
project apart. If he is at all, it is only as an erstwhile ape on a pedestal 
before an audience. 
The end of the ape's speech attempts to create the illusion of a 
stable identity, but ends up re-confirming the division that drives its 
utterance. The ape, presumably, will go back to his wife, sit in his 
rocking chair and await his visitors. And yet the ape's life is not quite 
as staid as all that. The very next day he will have to re-present himself 
elsewhere. His being hangs by the thin thread of acceptance and 
reception, depending entirely on the presence of a human audience. If 
the variety stage provided the way out that he so desperately wanted 
(and he is very explicit on this point: "do your utmost to get onto the 
variety stage," [252] `setze alle Kraft an, um ins Variete zu kommen; 
das ist der Ausweg'[175]), it is also as much a trap as the cages to which 
he opposed it. In both places his being is on display. Furthermore, his 
being depends in no small part on what the audience applauds if and 
when they do: his frankness qua former ape, his skill as someone who 
represents their alienated condition (as an actor tout court), or his 
cleverness as a present-day ape who represents man's angst-ridden 
state so well. The division that he represents, the division that he is, 
tends in all three directions equally. Our ape is an aberration, a two- 
headed monster: he is himself, an other, and the gap in between-a fact 
that helps explain the half-crazed gaze that he sees in his wife's eye. It 
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is obviously the projection of a paranoid self-conception, but what 
matters is that it is there. In seeing himself through his wife, the ape sees 
his divided status. He sees himself, the loneliness of the creature who 
stands and speaks for two entities at the same time, the "1" and the "he" 
who are also "1" and "I." He sees the inevitable frustration of his efforts 
as he continually makes himself before a human audience, only to see 
the web undone by the mere sight of his wife. 
Thus the ape, in presenting himself, is caught in a rather unseemly 
double bind. As he struggles with the presentation of a necessary 
alienation to his audience, he finds that the more his project succeeds 
the more it is doomed to failure. As an alienated entity, he cannot 
proclaim both his current state and the state in relation to which he is 
estranged. He cannot present both sides of the mirror, as it were. Not, 
that is, unless he were to pose as and play himself, the speaking ape. 
This is a tale about failure, a failure inherent in the written gesture 
of self-designation. The ape spends a great deal of time going over and 
re-enacting the gap that separates his temporal self from his a-temporal 
self: he narrates his historical origins but takes care to separate them 
from his new, improved, stellar self. The only trouble is that the ape's 
performing self can perform nothing other than the history from which 
he is trying to distance himself. In this context, saying "I" refers to 
neither one nor the other, but to the impossibility of saying either one, 
to the necessity of putting "I" in quotes, of living up to the ape's final 
claim of having only reported himself to the honored members of the 
academy. 
As such, the ape stands (in the space of the parable) for the 
dilemma of Kafka trying to present himself to his audience, trying to 
present both his narrated and narrating selves without compromising 
his biographical amplitude. Kafka, unlike the ape, is not the self that he 
writes; he cannot display his previous self as the ape can display his 
body. The audience-both the ape's and Kafka's- mediates between 
the speaker's self and himself. The depersonalization concomitant 
with the status of the speaker in the first person derives from the 
necessarily masked intrusion of the third person into the fabric of his 
being, or rather of the being that he would like to present qua speaker 
before an audience. This intrusion, however, takes on a parabolic form 
itself, so that the ape's past (narrated) self attains a strictly textual 
existence that only becomes real with every performance. The parable 
stands in a similar relation to Kafka: rather than say "I," he must say 
"he" and point to the performing ape as the parabolic equivalent of 
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himself, as a quoted version of himself, a writer on display who 
necessarily becomes a performer in order to play himself.' Like the 
ape, Kafka must become what he sees in the mirror. This is, Kafka 
would have us believe (both in his tongue and in Blanchot' s) the crucial 
step to be taken by a writer. All writing is a de-metaphorization of that 
step, an effacing of the border between self and other, an incarnation 
of the image of the mirror together with the failure that necessarily 
follows from such a gesture." 
Notes 
1. To a certain extent this takes place on both narrative and meta-narrative 
levels: Kafka can only become himself (the writer that he is) by narrating an 
ape who can only become himself by narrating an ape who can. . . . The 
concern with the first-person and the extent or possibility of the author's 
implication therein constitutes the central concern of much of the Landarzt 
collection. For a far-reaching examination on the use of the first person in the 
collection as a whole the reader is referred to Kurt Fickert's "First Person 
Narrators in Kafka's Ein Landarzt Stories." 
2. This is in a way the lot of all autobiography. Philippe Lejeune raises these 
issues (the exact temporal location of the referent of the first person as well 
as the citational component of the first person pronoun) as exceptional or 
attenuating constraints that delimit the field of autobiography (Pacte 
autobiographique 20-21), a model according to which the "Report" would 
stand at the limit between autobiography and its other. 
3. The ape is not unique in this respect. Other performance-bound subjectivities 
permeate the Landarzt stories. The character of the new advocate (who was 
once Bucephalus) and the description of a never-ending performance with 
which "Auf der Galerie" opens are especially relevant here. 
4. The term is, of course, taken from Lacan. In the present context, however, 
it is used less in a strictly psychoanalytic sense than as a designation of the 
moment when the grasp gained of the self as other leads to the formation of 
an identity. 
5. Having said that, I should also point out that the ape represents these claims 
as part and parcel of his performed persona. There is an oscillation that 
parallels that of the performed self enacted on the part of the reader (or 
audience member) in this case, since the ape is aware of his body and makes 
a point of displaying his fur but goes on to discount its significance. He does 
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this, however, by assuring his audience that his animal state is as far behind 
him as theirs is behind them, which, to judge by what the audience sees, is not 
very far at all. Kafka, as usual, leaves his reader feeling very uncomfortable 
indeed. 
6. Page numbers refer to Kafka: The Complete Stories. Where necessary, 
references to the original will indicate page numbers in the Gesammelte 
Schriften. 
7. Or remaining true to one's vaguely defined self: if the lines that delimit that 
self are blurred, as they are in the ape's case, then the only way of becoming 
oneself is not to be oneself, to seek not freedom (which would be destructive 
of the peculiar brand of self-deception that drives the ape) but a way out, 
Ausweg. 
8. It is, rather a crossing, a translation from one space to another, from one side 
of the mirror to another, a making literal of the figurative, a demetaphorization. 
9. The citational format is used deliberately here, since, having established the 
parallel between the ape and the writer, the claim regarding the theatrical basis 
of the production of autobiography applies equally both to Kafka's text ("Ein 
Bericht fiir eine Akademie") and the ape's discourse. 
10. Kafka's use of the term Affentum implies the verb Offen (to ape, to imitate) 
as well as the noun Affe (ape). The repudiation of Affentum thus connotes an 
end to mimicry and the advent of authenticity. The largest claim our ape makes 
is that he no longer mimics anyone but himself, with the proviso that he cannot 
simply be, he can only mimic that self. 
11. In a manner of speaking, the ape constructs another mirror stage by turning 
the mirror around. His success in this endeavour is attested to by his first 
trainer's going mad and spending some time in the asylum. 
12. If not on some phantasmic level, as a previous self still contained within 
the bounds of the present, much as every author's written self becomes part 
and parcel of that author (qua textual function). 
13. The author would like to thank Ora Avni and Ralph Schoolcraft for all 
their help with this essay. 
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